SN
181 of the average Chinese seems to be fatalistic, considering
991 Providence or Heaven to determine his fortune in life. In general, the average Chinese is rather indifferent in religious matters, although he might be sensitive if someone looked askance on his belief in local spirits, demons, and gods,
SN but this is merely a matter of tradition rather than religion.
181 The Chinese is strongly individualistic and usually dislikes to be ordered around and governed; he ardently defends his own opinions. His inclination for social groupings is obvious. Wherever Chinese live, they soon form integrated communities and at times of distress or in critical situations they are ready to help each other collectively, a characteristic tendency found especially within the extended family, which as a rule feels itself responsible as a whole for debts, misdeeds, etc., of any member. The Chinese are reported to be basically anti-militaristic, although this may be more a traditional attitude of the literati than a sound fact, considering only the last fifty years of Chinese history. However, a Chinese proverb says, "From good iron do not make nails; from good men do not make soldiers." To toil his fields in peace, to make a living this way, and to raise his children, whom he deeply loves, and not to be interfered with by state and government, can be described as the average conception of
SN the "good life." The average Chinese of the Northwest lives
342 in simple mud or stone houses (in the Yellow River area,
35 caves of the adjacent loess hills), stove, k'ang, and ancestor
SN altar being almost the only furniture.
517 Culture, art, and literature were primarily fostered by
501 the richer merchants, land and water owners, and, or course,
565 the officials and scholars. These groups represented, up to
● 423 1949, an economically powerful class who owned a considerable part of the land and the water rights. Chinese officials of the
SN frontier provinces had a reputation for being extremely money-
565 minded. The Chinese gentry, consisting of former officials
501 and degree holders, who were in many cases at the same time
423 holders of land or watter rights, have been abolished as a
178 class, while large parts of the academic strata, the intelligentsia,
668 became more or less the Communist avantgarde of China, showing the same phenomenon which appeared in Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Italy, etc., before and during the Second World War, where the intelligentsia showed a deep
SN inclination towards Communism.
563 In regard to the nomadic minorities of the Northwest (Kirghiz,
233 Kazakhs, Mongols and Tibetans) the dominant social motives are two fold, and can be subdivided into an economic and a religious one, equally strong. The whole economic life of the nomads is centered around their livestock. The nomad's life

1: Washington S-4 (no date) 1956 AF13 Northwest China AF13
Sinkiang AI1
Kazak RQ2

S N 563 233 [423] [476]

V. Individualistic and Collectivistic Bents and Traditions

The nomadic society of the Kirghiz, Kazakhs and Mongols shows collectivistic trends insofar as the pastures are always owned collectively and the livestock can be taken care of and protected only cooperatively. In periods of war and uprisings, the livestock had to be protected militarily, which was one reason why the military organization of the nomads, introduced by Chingis Khan, survived up to the twentieth century. Here we can say that the nomadic Kirghiz and Kazakh still shows a tremendous martial spirit, especially the Kazakhs who fought the Communists in 1949 and 1950 in a heroic way in spite of the fact that they were outnumbered from the very beginning.

N S 563 181

As a matter of fact, the Mongols show much less martial spirit than neighboring Kirghiz, Kazakh and especially Tibetans, who constantly rise up here and there, becoming a major nuisance for Peking, although they are hopelessly outnumbered by Chinese Communist Troops. Many explorers agree independently that the Mongols, once intrepid, dauntless, unafraid, frightful and terrifying warriors, make now the impression of being inefficient soldiers, timid, downhearted, and discouraged (so Rockhill, Howorth, Tafel, Vladimirtsov, Hedin, Futterer, and Filchner). Russian scholars, above all B. Vladimirtsov in his Le Regime Social Des Mongols, Le feodalisme Nomade, Paris 1948, blame Buddhism for the disappearance of the martial spirit and courage of the Mongols. This opinion is, however, contradicted by the fact that Tibetans, who have been influenced by Buddhism some centuries longer than the Mongols, are well-known as tough and cunning fighters and apparently fearless and daring insurgents.

S N 563 181 771 114

N 563 992

Almost every Tibetan family has at least one son in a monastery. They faithfully pay their tributes to these monasteries where their sons live as novices or monks. The monasteries are the only cultural centers of the nomads. Kumbum might be named as a magnificent example in regard to external architectural beauty as well as internal wealth in respect to its library, printing house, and the spiritual value of its schools and its Lamaistic academies.

S N 563 668 233 [361]

There are many reasons to believe that the Communist regime is determined to abolish nomadism and to make the nomads sedentary or at least semi-sedentary. The first step was the erection of permanent winter sites. The attitude of the nomads toward the regime seems to be ambivalent. The erection of veterinary stations for the livestock and the extension of additional irrigated pastures certainly are measures approved by the nomads but on the other hand the threatening

encampment, or they may consist of a group of friends or relatives. Some go only to the neighboring farmers, but more gain is to be found in the trade at the border. Winter also is the time for weaving the yak hair cloth, for preparing and repairing equipment, and for visiting and gossip. The period of high festivity is approaching. The traders return from their travels and the nomads flow en masse to the monastery centers for the observation of the mid-winter festival. During the festivals religion is combined with both pleasure and business. Almost every family has its representatives among the monks so that family reunions heighten the gaiety of the season. Trade is brisk for the monastery centers are also market towns. Maidens contract alliances with the swashbuckling young nomads, and some of these affairs ripen into marriages. Business of another nature may also be contracted at this time. Once the spring movements commence, the nomads find it advisable to travel with a minimum of baggage both for actual convenience of movement, and to lessen the loss incurred should a raid occur. Thus advantage is taken of this opportunity to store one's valuables in the care of the monastery, and more particularly with a monk related to the owner. From mid-winter until the horses are too jaded in early spring, the major occupation can only be described as robbery and attempted robbery. Large-scale caravans from other parts of Tibet and from China make the most desirable prey.

Ekvall and Yu reported that the winter grazing grounds belonged to the encampment, and that the territories in which the pastures were located, and assigned, were the property of the larger units (or tribes, as they are sometimes called) consisting of a number of encampments. The winter hay fields were individual's own property. These units might be under the jurisdiction of a chief or they might form a rather loose confederation without marked central authority. In some instances the actual "chief" might be one of the local monasteries, whose head will exercise civil authority over the laity. Infrequently a chief might even control several larger units, in which case he would be referred to as gyalpo or "king." But even the most nearly autocratic chief exercised caution in asserting his position, lest a disgruntled encampment, or some tents, might leave his jurisdiction for the welcoming embrace of some other chief. The latter would then have complete information necessary for conducting a successful foray against the first group. Thus, just as within the encampment, the actual authority in these larger units rested in the hands of a council of elders, representing each of the component encampments.

Although there are clans in Tibet which have played important roles in the history of some of the ruling families, they perform no major function among the Tibetan nomads. The encampment is not based on clan affiliation. Such affiliations even cross the lines of the larger units. (Cf. Ekvall, 1939 and Yu, 1947). The clan

/The Sedentary Tibetans/

+563 62 [622] [623] [632] [792] There is more rigidity about the village organization. The sedentary Tibetans generally have a formally selected village headman. But again the council of elders has considerable authority. Groups of villages are organized into a larger unit, nor is it uncommon for villages and encampments to be joined together in such a larger unit. A monastery is more apt to have authority over a group of villages than over the strictly nomadic people. However, like the nomads, the sedentary [622] Tibetans give very little recognition to any authority beyond that of the ecclesiastical or lay chief of the "tribe". Ma Ho-t'ien, in his Diary of Travels in the Border Region of Kansu, Chinghai and Tibet makes frequent reference to the inability of the Chinese officials to exert any sort of authority over the border-Tibetans and other sources also record the absence of any effective government beyond the local level.

The village itself represents a very tightly-knit organization, economically and politically, as well as physically. [423] Houses, housesites and the fields belong to the individual families, but the grazing lands and forests are community property. Use of the pastureland is available to all, but the village may place certain restrictions on the quantities of timber that may be taken for specific purposes.

+563 62 241 [787] [292] Just as the nomads act simultaneously in moving their encampments from one site to another, so the sedentary Tibetans also insist on simultaneous group action within the village. The first day of spring planting, determined by horoscope, sees all the villagers proceeding to their individual fields in their best clothing. The fields are ploughed simultaneously. The seeds are sown at the same time in each field. And, when harvest time comes, all the fields must be completely harvested in the time that it takes the smallest field to be harvested with a small hand sickle. If one's fields are too large one hires extra help. During the course of the growing season all the villagers periodically parade through the fields carrying the holy books on their heads. These communal activities have both religious and economic bases.

[787] [776] [782] From the viewpoint of the religion, if the days have been selected as auspicious, they are auspicious for the community's members as a whole. It is when the spirits of the ground, the demons of hail and misfortune can be allayed or propitiated that determines the best days for performing the needed tasks. From the viewpoint of economics, when the ground has been plowed and the seeds planted, the fields are encircled by a community fence to prevent onslaughts by roaming animals.

[625] [486] [651] A community watchman also stands guard. It also means that the villagers can collect a tax from caravans that pass through their lands. Once the fields have been harvested, the community

or later is assimilated. But if a Chinese family goes there to live it will remain Chinese and will attract other Chinese families. After a few decades the whole community becomes Chinese.

In addition to familial cross-contacts, there are others of a strictly economic character. Certain craftsmen, such as carpenters, blacksmiths, and millers, very easily obtain a foothold in a Tibetan community. They find very poor competition from most of the Tibetan artisans, although once in a while there is a Tibetan workman of outstanding skill and reputation. Much of the village trade also will gradually pass into the hands of the Chinese traders. Also, poor Chinese come to the Tibetan villages as laborers, lumbermen and charcoal burners.

An isolated Chinese migrant in the midst of Tibetan influence and environment undoubtedly would become Tibetan. But actually this situation does not exist. Behind the individual Chinese and reinforcing him in successive stages is sustained population pressure from the Chinese country. One by one, others follow his lead and press into the Tibetan community through the opening he has made. Once a number of Chinese families are established in a village, they are sure to become dominant simply as a result of the differential birth rates. Slowly the community becomes increasingly like a Chinese village. Finally, Chinese influence is paramount because the agents who exert that influence and spread that culture have a definite advantage over the Tibetans. They can talk the language of Government officials and wealthy merchants and traders, and they have superior business acumen and industry. The village oil-press or grist-mill eventually passes into the hands of a Chinese if, as is more usual, he has not started it himself. So the Chinese members of the village community forge to the front. After a certain length of time, a once-Tibetan village will become very much like a Chinese community. Even when the village has become all "Chinese", however, the quiver shrines of the mountain gods at the highest mountain peaks still are tended and replenished annually. Thus certain aspects of Tibetan culture and religious observance persist despite the otherwise complete transformation of the Tibetan village into a Chinese one.

There is little information about social classes and land tenure in the far Northwest. However, the general impression is that in the central and eastern parts of Shensi and in the important cities of Kansu, where the population is mainly Chinese, the patterns of social distinction and land distribution are similar to those of China Proper. The Chinese in these areas and in all the other provinces have fundamentally the same culture, with only some minor local variations. For this reason, the reader is referred to the section on Social Structure in the General Handbook.

/Chinese Moslems (Dungans)/

S N 563 763 769 making of a will, the giving of alms, rites at the grave, and the recitation of prayers and giving of alms on certain days after death, and on the first, second and third anniversaries.

The Moslems have their own burial grounds. The mounds raised over the graves are rectangular, not round as in the case of the Chinese. The top of the filled grave must be at least five inches (half a Chinese foot) above the surrounding earth, lest the location be forgotten. A stone may be erected in front of the grave, but the name of the deceased may not be engraved upon it.

S N 563 764

e. Festivals and holidays

S N 563 796 Many of the religious festivals are more pagan than Moslem, especially those which are seasonal and therefore not connected with the Moslem calendar. Their celebrations are merely popular gatherings for feasting and enjoyment.

The Moslem New Year (Yengi Yil) celebrates the breaking of the Ramadan fast. The festival takes place during the first three days of the tenth month by the Moslem calendar. Special services are held in the mosques. The people bathe and dress in their best clothes. It is a time of greeting, well-wishing, feasting, visiting and gift-giving. For the Moslems and the Chinese alike, the New Year celebration is the greatest holiday of the year.

S N 563 795 668 199

5. Present day conditions

According to a speech delivered by Burkhan, chairman of the Preparatory Committee of the China Islamic Association, at the Conference of the Asian and Pacific Regions, on October 18, 1952, the Islam religion as well as the customs and habits of its followers are fully respected by the Communist regime. Chinese Moslems are free to practice their faith without interference. It is also said that official circulars from Peking have ordered the people to continue the observance of their important festivals. The tax on the slaughter of cattle for Moslem consumption is abolished, and official holidays are granted on Moslem holidays.

S N [423]

In accordance with the Agrarian Reform Law, the mosques may retain their land holdings if the local populace so desire. It is also reported that when the land reform movement was carried out in the Northwest, the land of the mosques was in most cases left untouched. There was also a report of an organized Hajji to Mecca in 1952, which for reasons unknown failed to reach its goal. Special government regulations give Moslem workers in public organizations and educational institutions time off on the more important religious festival days. In military units, factories and schools, consideration is also given to the habits and customs of cadres, soldiers, workers and students of the Moslem faith.

792 the two monasteries there has been a total of five to seven thousand monks. These monks came not only from the immediate area, but were attracted by the prestige or teachings of the monasteries from Mongolia and other areas on the Chinese border.

792 871 Labrang prides itself on being one of the six major academic monasteries in all Tibet. Ma Ho-t'ien even claims for it more complete systems of education and organization than are to be found at the central Tibetan centers of Ganden, Sera and Tashihlumpo. But this pride is modified by the fact that an academic degree of Geshe from Labrang is not actually recognized in Tibet proper. The Labrang incarnations, Chia-mu-yang, have generally gone to Depung in Lhasa to receive instructions.

792 [778] [423] [651] Kumbum can rest on its laurels as a place of holy pilgrimage. Within its grounds is the rock associated with Tsong-kha-pa's birth; so too is there the famed tree that supposedly sprang from the shorn locks of the Great Reformer. Both monasteries own much land and represent great wealth. Some has come in the form of the accumulated gifts and donations of the pious. Still more is representative of taxes imposed over the years on their local subjects, for, like many of the smaller monasteries, these two are the seats of secular rule as well as religious reverence.

792 701 In return for the gifts and other revenue, however, the monasteries perform many functions for their subjects and believers. In the turbulent conflicts between Moslems, Chinese and Tibetans, the monasteries have represented the effective military force of the area. Rijnhart, Ekvall, Ma and others who have been present in crises have all reported the efficacy of the fighting monks. Their strongholds serve as banks for the wealth of all in danger from looting; their armed force stands for the safety of Chinese, Tibetans and foreigners who seek refuge. Nor is there any perceptible hesitancy about the prospects of taking life when the lama war cry, "Sha-sa, sha-sa" (Eat meat, eat meat!), summons the monks to arms. Sometimes these armies [669] were aroused by major crises, such as those of the Moslem rebellions in the late 1800's. They have also done battle against the Communists in the 1930's. And when no greater danger threatens, they are apt to do battle among themselves on an inter-sect or local rivalry basis.

792 795 But the hold of the monasteries cannot be measured solely in terms of the social and political roles they fulfill. The religion of Lamaism is a very tenacious one. The complete conversion of Tibetans to another faith, be it Christianity or Islam, remains on a very small scale. Within the Lamaist structure, the hold of the older sects is the strongest, especially in areas that have remained outside the control of Lhasa. And underneath

/Chinese, Chinese Moslems and Sedentary Tibetans/

181 use it. In this little backwater town large business deals were
436 effected, but each roll of dollars received for payment was opened, the contents carefully examined, and the individual coins valued a little higher or a little lower according to the Tunhwang standard." (pp. 69-70).

• 423 The landowners in the Tunhwang district are mainly Chinese whose ancestors were established here very long ago. The Chi-
181 nese farmers are more conservative than the town folks. The rural
369 rural pattern here is different from that of other parts of the North-
241 west. Here the farmsteads are dotted over the area, each stands
361 in the center of its own land and each at a considerable distance from the other. The larger farms are surrounded by a high wall
[351] which is a small fortification, and inside the wall is a substantial
[342] house made of sun-dried bricks and excellent timber. Most of
[621] the farmsteads are spacious and built to accommodate large num-
[614] bers of people, for it is customary that all the members of a clan live together in their generations.

631 The author of The Gobi Desert recorded another interesting feature of the Tunhwang oasis. The record says that Tunhwang is divided into as many sections as there are prefectures in the whole of the province of Kansu. Its colonization brought men from all areas, who were anxious to honor the cities which they represented, by erecting temple buildings. The result is that the traveller wanders through the oasis as through a replica of the whole province of Kansu, stepping from the section called after the town of Chingchow to that called Liangchow, from Kaotai to Pingfan, or from Pingliang to Titao, in the course of an afternoon
[532] stroll. Near one of these temples was a very old carved stone
[192] figure of a man, which was not an idol but was said to represent a historic personage.

157 Of the Chinese people of the wayside in the Gobi Desert Miss Cable writes: "The intense isolation of the inhabitant of a
485 small oasis, and the extraordinarily low standard of life imposed
[511] upon him, produce a strange mentality. His normal condition is torpor. He sits or lies on his mud bed and thinks of nothing. Only when a traveler arrives does he experience the discomfort of rousing himself, but then though it may be cold or windy, he must leave the pleasant stuffiness of his bed-living-room, throw off the greasy coverlet which he has drawn over his crossed legs, come into the open and give the service, which is demanded of him as innkeeper. The life of the innkeeper's wife is more bare and poor. Clothing, which has some place in the thought of nearly every woman, is, to her, absolutely nothing but a protection from cold and a covering for her nakedness. The other incidents of her life are concerned with food and the birth of her children. She knows that her husband has some money, but she has never thought of money as a means of securing comforts

/Chinese, Chinese Moslems and Sedentary Tibetans/

565 829 181 extremely obedient and timid toward the government officials. Anyone who has some connection with the government can command the service and materials of the small people. One who has just a sword may act as a lord in the Chinese rural community. The common people in these communities are too meek and ignorant to resist. The rural people in general are primarily concerned with their food problem. Their attitude toward anything is affected by this problem. Their attitude toward the coming of the Communists, for example, was quite interesting. They were anxious to know how far the Communists were and how great the possibility was of their coming. When they were asked how they felt about the coming of the Communists, the answer was that what they feared mostly about the Communists was that the Communists might eat up all the food they had and then they would be left to starvation. They seemed to believe that the Communists would not persecute them because they were just poor people. They had heard that the people in Szechwan called the Communists the misfortune bringers. It meant that wherever the Communists appeared they would bring misfortune. The Kansu people would not care how sweet the Communist promises might be, if the Communists had to live off the province's scanty food supply, they were not wanted. This shows that the economic conditions in the Northwest, as in other places, had great influence on the people's political attitude.

565 829 668 179

However, this does not mean that the Chinese peasants in the Northwest care only about their stomach and overlook all else. They also resent the fact that the government officials and the local gentry looked down upon them and treated them as people of little value. It is reported that bad administration of the local government at that time was the reason that the local Communists, led by a man named Liu Tzu-tan, were able to make considerable progress among the peasants in a big territory between the provinces of Shensi, Kansu and Ninghsia. The Communists gave the people many kinds of little or temporary advantages and made all sorts of big promises. At the moment they looked much better than the local government officials and therefore they won the people's confidence and support. It is reported that when the government tried to call the people in the villages to a meeting so they might be enlightened about the government's policy, very few came. But whenever Liu Tzu-tan wanted a mass meeting, the peasants swarmed into wherever the gathering was held. Liu Tzu-tan knew the common people's psychology and their dire needs, and he skillfully played these factors for his purpose. Consequently, his movement was very successful among the rural masses.

423 According to Fan Ch'ang-chiang's report, the Chinese farmers in the areas between Shensi, Kansu and Ninghsia were by and large landowners, not tenants. The areas were very thinly populated

1: Washington S-4 (no date) 1956 AF13 Northwest China AF13

• 423 and therefore land was abundant. Among the landowners there were quite a few with extremely large holdings. It is reported that the amount of farm and grazing land owned by a family was so big that it was not measured by acre or by any other unit but was simply estimated as reading from this mountain to that mountain, or from this river to that river. Thus these people's attitude toward land must have been different from that of the people in the coastal provinces. They certainly would not treasure their land so much as farmers of other places. This assumption is verified by the fact that the peasants in these areas would easily abandon their farms and migrate to other places whenever the farming business failed to produce an adequate livelihood. Also, merely large landholdings would not necessarily make a [556] person wealthy. It depends very much on whether or not there are irrigation facilities. Without such facilities, the land might mean nothing.

*563 578 Racial relations in the Northwest are very complicated. This complication influenced not only political and social affairs but also people's attitudes toward each other. Fan reports that in the province of Ch'inghai the Chinese and the Chinese-speaking Moslems all considered themselves civilized and thought of the Tibetans and Mongols as primitive tribes. Both the Chinese and the Chinese-speaking Moslems claimed that they were people from China Proper, chung-yüan. Between the Chinese and the Chinese-speaking Moslems in that province there was also much discrimination. The Chinese-speaking Moslems held all the key political, economic, and military positions and they were the predominant group while the Chinese either had no such positions or had only the secondary or insignificant ones. This discrimination had undoubtedly fostered a great deal of bitterness in the Chinese toward the Moslems.

*563 181 183 829 [674] About the Chinese-speaking Moslems in the district of Ho-chou, Kansu, Fan has this to say: The Chinese-speaking Moslems in Ho-chou are brave and disposed to fight or to make war. They praise warriors but look down upon literature. They have the characteristics of the ancient Spartan people. In their communities stealing and robbery are not things to be frowned upon, as long as they are not done to their own people. If a person left his community empty-handed and came back after a year or so with a big horse and many precious things he would certainly be lavishly praised by his relatives and neighbors as a hero or a worthy man. Nobody would care to ask how the man acquired his wealth. But if such a man came back without any gain and bore the mark of having been captured and punished for stealing or

*563 181 526 robbery, he would be exposed to humiliation. In order to express their warlike spirit and to train their people for fighting and bravery, the Chinese-speaking Moslems in Ho-chou have numerous

C
641 in the Constitution of the People's Republic of China. There are
668 many followers of religions in China. It would be unwise, the
771 spokesman argued, to offend them all. He repeatedly emphasized,
829 however, that the world outlook of the Marxists is in every way contradictory to that of religious believers. The solution is , "the religious believers must abide by the Constitution and the law. The policy of freedom of worship must not be allowed to be used as a pretext for carrying out counter-revolutionary activities,... We must publicize among the masses of the Youth the materialistic world outlook... The youths should thus be given an ideological foundation... to make them into...atheists and the heroic fighters of the Socialist construction undertaking." (Ibid., p. 28).

C
641 The Communists believe that by turning the young people
668 against religion, all religion will eventually be eliminated when
771 the present believers die. However, the Communists will tolerate or even participate in religious activities for reasons of expediency. In Northwest China where the influence of Islam and Lamaism is great, the Communists have gone all out to woo the Moslems and the lamas. For instance, when the Communist army
N
641
* 668 marched into Ninghsia and Kansu, the commander of their First
771 Field Army, Pleng Te-huai, issued a special order to the whole
795 field army to honor the Moslem religious habits. Not only were the Mosques not to be damaged, but the order even demanded that every soldier wash his hands before he drew water from a well. In numerous cases, the Communists spent much money to repair the mosques and the lama temples. In the Soviet China stage the Communists had disqualified every monk as a citizen. (see above).

N
641 Obviously, the general civil rights promise in the Communist
642 Constitution are restricted. Mao Tes-tung's statements in his
* 668 "On People's Democratic Dictatorship" leave no doubt about this
C point.
641
642
668

E. Practices

N Some instances of infractions of these rights may serve as
* 668 examples. In 1951 some faculty members of the Provincial First
• 423 Middle School at Sian, Shensi, grumbled in private talks about the
578 "land reform." They said, "In the country, if you have two bowls
803 of rice to eat, you will not have peace." Because of this, Vice-Commissioner Lu Ch'in-liang of the Bureau of Culture and Education of Shensi Province wrote a special article and published it in the local newspaper. He severely criticized the tolerance of the administrators and accused the school of being a hiding place for counter-revolutionary ideas and opinions. Special groups were organized by the Northwest People's Supervisory Committee and the Northwest Department of Education to investigate the school. A special criticism was published in the nation-wide Party magazine, Hsüeh-hsi. As usual, this would indicate that a serious purge took place.

15

C
668 other living materials is limited to those which are "legitimate."
642 Thus landlords cannot legitimately collect rent on land and
421 interest on loans. The legal status of house rent and banks'
C payment of interest on deposit are not yet clarified. The duty of
[651] paying taxes (article 102), the privilege of working hard (article
[461] 91), and the responsibility of offering contributions in labor, money and kind, furnish more means for the Communist government to ensure "the gradual abolition of systems of exploitation and the building of a socialist society." (article 4)

C Late in 1950, the agrarian reform movement began to spread.
668 The movement did not concern itself only with the redistribution
423 of land, but also included the confiscation and redistribution of
422 draft animals, farm implements, grain supplies, and so forth, which was later to be followed by a program of cooperativization. Some excerpts from the Chinese press will illustrate how the agrarian reform was handled in the Northwest.

S The New China News Agency, November 16, 1950, reported:
[668] "The farmers in Sinkiang, including the various minorities, deeply
[421] felt the warmth of the People's Government and the People's Army
[651] and requested to pay more taxes (in grain).... At the same time, the peasants in various places universally started class struggle against the... criminal landlords."

The same agency, December 7, 1950, reported the start of a
S "Rent Reduction and Down with Local Despots" campaign in the
668 Northwest as a prelude to full scale land reform. From the win-
423 ter of 1950 through the spring of 1951, it was reported that 3017
N hsiang (administrative villages) confiscated more than 1,000,000
*668 mou of land (each mou is ca. 1/6 acre), 30,000 heads of draft
423 animals and more than 200,000 pieces of farm implements in Shensi, Kansu, Ninghsia, Chinghai and Sinkiang. By May, 1952, 4364 hsiang in the Northwest had completed 72.6% of the original quota. (NCNA, May 28, 1951). In total, during the winter and spring seasons of 1951 and 1952 more than 20,000,000 mou of land were confiscated in the Northwest. The population who received land and other productive material was from 10,000,000 to 12,000,000 people. (Sian Ch'üh-chung Jih-pao, May 5, 1952.)

S Thus Burhan, the Governor of Sinkiang, could report to the
668 Sinkiang Provincial People's Congress on September 20, 1955:
423 "From September, 1952 to the end of 1953, in the agricultural district of Sinkiang we completed the whole program of land reform. We destroyed the landlord class. We abolished feudal land ownership. We confiscated and condemned more than 7,300,000 mou land and other properties to be distributed to 2,100,000 poor farmers with little or no land."

S A report by the Vice Secretary-general of the Communist
[578] party at Aksu, Sinkiang, P'eng I-min, in Sinkiang jih-pao, April 3, 1953, reveals, however, some of the difficulties which the land reform movement encountered in Sinkiang.

S 668 423 574 474

reform movement encountered in Sinkiang. The attempts at forced cooperation resulted in many hard feelings and in violations of the principles set forth by the government. Examples were cited of "middle farmers" supplying carts or other tools, but not participating in the actual labor. Village cadres were unwilling to work on the cooperative farms lest their private interests suffer. Considerable difficulties were experienced in finding people who would accept responsibility. A partial solution was sought in sending more professional party workers to aid the cadres.

N #668 • 423 474 S 668 423 474

Similar reports are available from other parts of the Northwest. From these reports the following trends can be gathered:
(1) In the program of cooperativization the policy was to exclude not only the landlords but also the rich farmers. Since those who were not in the cooperatives would suffer social and economic ostracisim, the threat to all individual farmers kept out of the cooperatives was great.
(2) The experience of those who did join the cooperative groups, however, was not happy. Their hard work often was not properly rewarded. It was difficult to keep the record of credits straight. This was the reason why many cooperatives collapsed.
(3) However, the average farmer, including the party cadre, dreamed of becoming a rich farmer and private businessman.

Against this background one can understand the significance of Mao Tse-tung's drive for one million cooperatives in 1955. According to Mao's plan, by the spring of 1958 half of the agricultural population must be organized into cooperatives. In other words, by that time, half of the farmers in Northwest China would no longer be working on their own farms.

N #668 472 S 668 472

In the field of commerce and industry, the 3-anti and 5-anti movements were the prelude to the program which calls for the total elimination of private enterprise.

As described above, the political rights in the Chinese Soviet days followed the conventional Communist Party line. But during the Second World War, the Chinese Communists had advocated their democratic government and democratic elections in the border regions. Their procedure of a secret ballot included the following practices: "Each of the candidates' names is written on a bowl. The voter drops a bean or pea in the bowl bearing the name of his choice. If his election "unit" is entitled to more than one representative, he is given the proper number of beans. If a considerable number of the voters cannot read, the candidates are lined up, each carrying a well-calanced bowl or basket on his back. The voter drops his bean or beans into the bowl or bowls of his favorite candidate or candidates. The bowl is carried on the back to insure secrecy, so that no candidate knows who elects whom." (Hsu Yung Ying: A Survey of Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia Border Region, Part I, p. 59.)

1: Washington S-4 (no date) 1956 AF13 Northwest China AF13

241 311 131 423 The following chart indicates the area of the four separate provinces, the amount of cultivated land, the number of farm households, and the average number of acres per farm. (Cressey, p. 105).

Province	Area in Acres	Cultivated Land	Farm Households	Acres per Farm
Kansu	96,741,133	4,310,000 acres	793,000	5.4
Ninghsia	57,653,372	304,000 acres	54,000	5.6
Shensi	46,432,319	7,514,000 acres	1,385,000	5.4
Chinghai	164,874,016	1,284,000 acres	237,000	5.4
Total	365,700,840	13,412,000	2,469,000	

Of the total area of these four provinces, roughly thirteen per cent is under cultivation (1946 figures). A survey of the National Agricultural Research Bureau findings of 1943 indicates that additional land that could be brought under cultivation is, except for Ninghsia, extremely limited. (China Handbook 1937-1943, p. 547.)

241 311 133 132 The extent of cultivation on the hills of this area depends upon the elevation, steepness, and the dryness of the climate. High elevations have a greater precipitation, more favorable for farming. The drier, steeper hills have sparse, wild vegetation growth only; used for sheep grazing. Although one is impressed with the degree to which such hilly land in this dry climate is cultivated, it is probable that it has extended beyond the most profitable use of the land. In fact, according to one agricultural economist, it might be more economical if more of this land were devoted to grazing; if better varieties of grasses and improved breeds of sheep were introduced, the income derived from pastoral utilization might be greater. (T.H. Shen, Agriculture Resources of China. p. 153.)

241 133 134 Terracing is prevalent and is practiced on eighteen per cent of all cultivated land. Much of the hill land is also cultivated in a modified form of contour farming. The slopes of the fields are so steep and the fields so wide that although there is some attempt at contour farming, it is not well carried out and the erosion is very severe; in fact, erosion is so serious that production is meager and some of the land has been abandoned.

241 The principal crops grown are wheat, cotton, rice in the irrigated areas of Wu-wei and Ninghsia, millet, and Irish potatoes. Cotton production is particularly extensive in Kansu and Shensi. The following figures are from the China Handbook (1937-1943) and they show the acreage and production for 1937-1942.

241 489 culture on land already under cultivation might be realized.

The Nationalist Government gave no financial assistance of 241 any magnitude until the Second World War. Finally, when it was 654 forced to retreat into the remote areas of Southwest China, the 175 government had to depend largely on the Northwest for food and revenue (agricultural taxes). The Nationalist Government became more interested in the agricultural development of the Northwest and some experimental stations were set up in Kansu. Government assistance, however, was directed primarily to farmers engaged in producing crops for the war effort; e.g., cotton.

241 After 1938, the price index for farm products rose rapidly in 175 all four provinces and the purchasing power of the farmers began [435] to grow. After 1940, food prices rose speedily and the farmers had more money than in prewar days. By examination of the [433] data of the war years as to whether farmers undertook to increase their scale of production and thereby extend cultivation, we can say that there was little increase in extensive farming (except in the case of Ninghsia) and that the output increases during this period can be attributed (wheat especially) largely to intensive farming.

241 Turning to the land tenure system, the percentage of farmers • 423 who are owners, partowners and tenants, as determined by a land survey undertaken by J. L. Buck, reveals that on the average most of the farmers own their own plots of land. The following [175] chart, compiled from data collected by Buck in 1933 on a sample basis gives us the landholding breakdown. In Farm Survey (a), [427] farmers who own their farmsteads but who rent all their crop land are classified as tenants rather than as partowners. When compared to the agricultural survey (b), (in this survey, 236 localities, 146 hsien, and twenty provinces in China were examined), the results in both cases are similar except in the case of Chinghai where the few samples taken disallows an accurate breakdown. (Land Utilization in China p. 57.)

Percentage of farmers who are owners, partowners and tenants

241 423 427 171 162

Province & local	Farm Survey (a)			Agricultural Survey (b)		
Kansu	owner	part-owner	tenant	owner	part-owner	tenant
Kao-lan	86.0	11.0	3.0	60.0	15.0	25.0
Lin-hsia	-	-	-	60.0	10.0	30.0
Wu-wei	96.0	4.0	0	60.0	25.0	15.0
Yung-teng	-	-	-	35.0	5.0	60.0
Ping-liang	82.0	17.0	1.0	85.0	10.0	5.0
Tien-shu	62.0	21.0	17.0	50.0	30.0	20.0
Average	78.6	14.2	7.2	58.4	15.8	25.8
Ninghsia	98.0	2.0	0	96.0	1.0	3.0
Chinghai						
Hwang-yau	67.3	22.7	10.0	-	-	-

241 Kuei-teh	-	-	-	30.0	10.0	60.0
423 Hsi-ning	77.8	19.4	2.8	-	-	-
427 Wei-yüan	-	-	-	10.0	5.0	85.0
191 Average	72.6	20.5	6.4	20.0	7.5	72.5
162 Shensi						
Ting-pien	72.0	20.0	8.0	-	-	-
Yu-lin	66.0	26.0	8.0	-	-	-
Average for 20 locals	69.8	16.0	14.0	70.0	14.1	15.9
Average	69.4	20.6	10.0	70.0	14.1	15.9

241 423 427 175 [114] The following charts are the results of agricultural surveys taken during the war years by the Nationalist Government. They are on a percentage basis and bear out the validity of Buck's findings; namely, that tenantry in the Northwest is not a serious problem. It is dangerous to try and depict any trend from these statistics; although this period reflects a higher standard of living for the peasantry because of high wartime prices, it usually takes a long time to bring about any change in landed relations, since peasant attitudes are fixed and not susceptible to immediate change. (China Handbook 1937-1945, pp. 458-59, revised and enlarged with 1946 Supplement.)

241 427 175 162 Percentage of tenant farmers in China

Province	1937	1938	1939	1940	1941	1942	1943	1944
Ninghsia	18	21	16	10	15	14	15	13
Chinghai	19	18	18	21	24	28	18	21
Kansu	19	16	22	18	18	21	22	18
Shensi	18	22	25	22	23	25	21	24

241 423 175 162 Percentage of owner farmers in China

Province	1937	1938	1939	1940	1941	1942	1943	1944
Ninghsia	68	66	65	74	74	74	78	68
Chinghai	51	61	58	61	51	51	78	58
Kansu	61	66	59	62	61	60	55	63
Shensi	61	57	55	58	57	56	59	58

Percentage of part-owner farmers in China

Province	1937	1938	1939	1940	1941	1942	1943	1944
Ninghsia	14	13	19	16	11	12	7	19
Chinghai	30	21	24	18	25	21	27	21
Kansu	20	18	19	20	21	19	19	19
Shensi	21	21	20	20	20	19	20	18

427 [175] There are three systems for paying land rent; namely, cash rent, crop rent, and share rent. When a tenant rents his land by paying a fixed amount of money per mou to his landlord, it is cash rent. If he pays a fixed amount of cereals produced on the land, it is crop rent. If he divides the crops raised on his rented land with his landlord at a fixed ratio, it is share rent. No investigations were made during World War II regarding the systems of paying rent. The latest study was made in 1934 by the National

236 (T.H. Shen, p. 326.) The following is in 1,000 metric tons:
433

Province	Sheep Wool	Camel Hair	Cashmere
Kansu	3,611	180	30
Ninghsia	1,846	299	92
Chinghai	4,840	60	-
Sinkiang	12,853	22	10
Total	23,150	561	132

241 In Chinghai and elsewhere in the region fertilizer is scarce and the thick sod on the uncultivated hilltops is burnt in piles to help meet the fertilizer requirements of the fields below. The
311 following is a description of the principle livestock raising area
233 in Kansu and Chinghai. "The pasture land in Kansu and in the agricultural part of Chinghai is mostly the hill land far away from
[423] the cultivated fields and villages. It is not owned by farmers individually or collectively. It is public land. The right to graze these pastures is determined by the natural location of the villages in relation to these hills rather than by law. The nearest villages have more chance to use it. Sometimes one finds several villages grazing their sheep on the same hills without trouble. But if too many villages use the same pasture a definite agreement is made between the villages to limit certain villages to particular pastures. Such occasions rarely occur because the increase in sheep is naturally in accordance with the amount of pasture available. It is only in time of severe drought that the pastures are overstocked.

311 'The pasture of nomadic Chinghai (formerly a part of Tibet) is
423 also public land but different tribes and clans have the exclusive
233 right to use only such land as has been allotted to them by the government or by tradition. Within the boundaries of a certain tribe the pasture is open to all its member families, but no family owns any particular lot. There is no fencing or walls.

311 'The condition of these pastures is determined by annual rain-
233 fall. More rain and snow assure better grass. No human effort, such as seeding, manuring, irrigation or drainage is ever applied." (Buck, Land Utilization p. 176.)

4. Forestry

313 The following chart indicates the percentage of forest land for the region.

Province	Percentage of land in Forest
Kansu	6.0
Ninghsia	4.0
Shensi	16.0
Chinghai	2.0

If we leave out Shensi as a section of the Northwest, as George B. Cressy does, the Northwest is reported to have only one twentieth as much standing timber as the Northeast region (Heilungkiang, Kirin, Liaoning), or 197,429,814 cubic meters, which is located

313 mostly in Kansu. In 1945, large-scale afforestation projects were
[185] undertaken by the provincial government, especially in Ninghsia. The exceptional fact about these projects was that the young seedlings were properly cared for and did not die as so frequently occurred in other afforestation schemes. The Ninghsia projects were, of course, taken over by the Chinese Communists.

311 In the loess plateau region, between the great wall and the
139 mountains, and between the Tibetan Highlands on the West and the Yellow plain to the East, there is almost no forest cover.
313 Forests are found only in the more inaccessible areas or in temple groves. Their disappearance is related partly to needs for lumber but also to the introduction of new crops, such as corn and Irish potatoes, which will grow on the upper slopes. Many hills
[241] were burned over in order to clear the land for a cultivation
[134] which could last for only a few years until erosion swept away the last trace of soil.

5. The border region

*175 In 1937, the Chinese Communists occupied the northern portion
*668 of Shensi as well as the fringe areas of Chinghai, Kansu, and
433 Ninghsia. This region was regarded as the Shensi, Kansu, Ninghsia, Chinghai border region and was developed by the Communists
[437] into a relatively self-sufficient area. When they were able, they exchanged surpluses such as oil, salt, herbs, skin and wool for articles which they could not as yet produce in sufficient quantity.

*175 The Communists carried out land reform as soon as they were
*668 fully entrenched in power. Large land holdings were cut up and
[423] parcelled out to peasants with little or no land. Rents and interest rates were reduced, efforts were made to extend cultivation, increase the number of draft animals, and develop labor cooperation beyond family circles.

*175 In a study by Yung-ying Hsü, issued by the Institute of Pacific
*668 Relations, there is a summary of the economy and military status
433 of this region. There are numerous statistics to indicate increases in production of certain crops. These are the only available statistics we have for the region during this period, and the figures seem to indicate that despite the excessive expenditures for the maintenance of an army and guerilla forces as well as a governing body and administration, progress was made in raising the level of agriculture. However, by 1943, trade figures for the region indicate an imbalance of payments and a drain of currency from the region indicating that increasing military commitments were absorbing the created wealth of the region.

13 D. Conclusion

241 We may sum up the obstacles to agricultural development as
311 follows: geographic and climatic problems are the most serious. The amount of cultivable land that can be reclaimed and used for

241 433 Such costs could be avoided if intensive farming measures were emphasized, internal markets developed, and these in turn linked to China through a network of transport.

II. The Communist Period

241 *668 ### A. General Outline of Communist Policy for Agriculture in the Northwest

The pattern of Chinese Communist agricultural policy for this region is similar to what has emerged in China. The only differences have been in the timing and pace of reform policies which stem from the varying political, economic, and geographic conditions of the Northwest.

When the People's Liberation Army had occupied the Northwest, [423] land reform on a regional scale commenced. By 1951 land reform was completed in areas with an agricultural population of seven million; rents were reduced in areas with an agricultural population of ten million. (Current Background, No. 141, November 27, 1951. General Chang Chih-chung on Development in the Northwest. p. 14.) Immediately upon completion of the land reform, concerted efforts were launched to increase the agricultural and livestock production of the Northwest through cooperativization; by establishing mutual aid teams and then combining these into agricultural producer cooperatives where land, farm implements, and livestock are pooled. The ultimate objective of the Chinese Communists is to cooperativize all agriculture in the Northwest, and through a network of such cooperatives, concentrate on raising productivity by expanding cultivation, sowing with better types of seeds, and using more advanced tools and farming methods. Cooperativization is taking place in villages and oases, and steps have been taken to establish state farms in regions where there are large tracts of reclaimed land.

241 *668 474 476 433

Survey teams were sent out to determine what land might be reclaimed and cultivated. Upon the estimates of these teams, units of the army went out to reclaim the land. Because most of the land surveyed was desert, the construction and extension of irrigation works, the building of reservoirs, the setting up of irrigation pumps to pump the water through newly-dug canals over the desert had to begin at almost the same time.

241 311 185 *668

311 185 *668 288 439 [248]

Some progress has been made in extending cultivation and planting cotton by reclaiming waste land. Communist planning is ambitious and in future five year plans, they intend to make the province of Shensi a textile processing area to which Sinkiang and other areas in the Northwest will ship their cotton. In this way, it is hoped to ultimately make the entire region self-sufficient in textile production. Textile factories are being erected in Sinkiang too for the purpose of processing cotton produced there, and it is already reported that some cotton cloth is being shipped to the U.S.S.R.

*668 185 248 311 suitable cotton strains for sowing and the best methods of irrigation for the large-scale cultivation of cotton in the province. 17,000 hectares (42,907 acres) are now being surveyed in the Kansu corridor and the vast plains along the Yellow River in Northwest China for future establishment of mechanized state farms. Altogether, the corridor and the plain are estimated to have over 650,000 hectares (1,616,150 acres) of wasteland. In 1954, it was found that the greater part of 200,000 hectares (494,200 acres) of wasteland surveyed was suitable for cotton; three new mechanized state farms have been set up so far there.

*668 241 369 Some of the information available on agricultural policy in Kansu deals with the area around Lanchow, where there is some suburban farming, and the development of cooperatives in the Wu-chung Hui Nationality Autonomous Chou of Kansu Province (from a speech by Ma Teng-ai delivered on July 22, 1955, to the National People's Congress). Discussion of these areas will not give us a complete picture of the progress or difficulties in agricultural development but they will indicate the trend of agriculture in Kansu.

[565] [423] In Lanchow, it was reported that the landlord class and "feudal" exploitation of the peasants in the suburban areas had been abolished. 15,112 mou (2,297 acres) of land had been confiscated and distributed among 20,400 peasants who possessed no land or very little. Production and livelihood materials were also distributed among these peasants. So far, seven vegetable and agricultural producer co-ops and 606 mutual aid teams are in existence in the suburban areas. These included roughly 32.46 per cent of the peasant households; expanding agr cultural production to meet the daily growing needs for vegetables in the city has been stressed. By fall of 1956 it is planned to have eighty-three per cent of all agricultural rural households in the suburbs, in agricultural producer co-ops. Two socialist vegetable producer co-ops will be established. Future emphasis will be on the expansion of vegetable farms, orchards, and development of poultry and pig rearing.

*668 241 369 The city of Lanchow has grown greatly in the past five years with the influx of troops, technicians, laborers, and their families. It is questionable whether agriculture in the surrounding areas can have maintained this population growth. This would imply that some food would need to have been shipped from China.

[474] [476] [443] There have been some difficulties in developing co-ops and mutual aid teams, as in other parts of the Northwest. Planned purchases and marketing of food, extremely critical in this neighborhood since the urban life of Lanchow rests upon these marketing procedures, have not been carried off successfuly and have slowed up cooperativization. There has been evidence of bureaucratization, lack of class responsibility toward the poor and middle peasants, and a lack of serious study and investigation of conditions.

N.W. China AFN
Kalmyk

After I had had my presents handed over, the conversation turned to 643
European weapons and the dsassak who already had a number of Russian 574
and English repeater guns, made every effort to buy some of my weapons. When I showed no inclination to comply with his wishes, the atmosphere became strained and I hurried to take my leave. /350/

The Barun dsassak (Plate LXXV), like all Dam Mongols, cannot 252
be relied upon. The flour for which I had paid him up in the Wulaseta Valley, was still not ground when I came to Barun kurä, and I was obliged to wait two days before I could get it. It was ground in hand-mills by old women and widows.

There were a great many beggars and cripples loafing about in 735
the dsassak's courtyard. They mumbled their Om mani padme hung and plucked at their rosaries without ceasing. There were people 644
coming and going all the time who paid tribute to the dsassak, and my companions were always amazed at how obsequious the Mongols were toward their ruler. Whereas the tent Tibetan shows very little respect toward his chieftain, the ordinary Mongol is bound by strict etiquette. He may never sit down with crossed legs before his prince, he must bend his right knee and remain in a half squatting, half kneeling position. If he is not invited to sit down he remains standing with his legs together. He must take his sword in his left hand and may not leave it sticking diagonally in his belt as he usually does.

The Mongol princes have incomparably greater prestige than the 643
chieftains of the Tibetan nomads. I have already spoken of the princes' right of preëmption. Besides that, the dsassak owns his entire country, he annually apportions the pastures and also the arable land among his subjects and for this he receives his tithe in the form of animals and grain. Moreover, he demands several days of [651]
gratuitous service from each family, which the wealthier ones may pay off in the form of added taxes. On his part he feels himself responsible only toward the priests, he always supports a few lamas and [792]
gives large gifts to the monasteries. In many things he is the only source of supply for his subjects. He had large supplies stored in his warehouses in Barunkurä. In them I saw pulo from Shigatse, lambskins from Lhasa, Nepalese amulet boxes, peacock feathers from India, saffron from Kashmir, Indian dates and cocoanut, Tibetan stag-antlers and pouches of musk, as well as American cotton materials, boots from Dankar, tea and the many little things with which the Chinese furnish the nomads of the highlands.

While I was staying there a huge felt yurt was erected in the court- 792
yard of the dsassak, measuring 10 meters in diameter. The tribal 346